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CURTIS

BROWN

THE NECESSARY A POSTERIORI: A RESPONSE TO TICHY

(Received19 August,1983)

I. INTRODUCTION

PavelTichy, in a recent article,I arguesthat SaulKripke'spurportedexamples
of necessarya posteriori truths2 are unsuccessful.I am sympatheticto some
of Tichy's assumptions and to some of his conclusions. But his arguments
seem misguidedto me, and I will try to explain why.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I discussTichy's criticismof
Kripke's treatment of the Hesperus-Phosphorusexample. That criticism is
seen to rest on the assumptionthat sentenceswhich expressthe same proposition are interchangeablein epistemic contexts, an assumptionKripke would
not accept. Neverthelessa revisedversionof Tichy's criticismmay be successful.
In the rest of the paper I adopt Tichy's assumption and explore what
someone who, unlike Kripke, accepts it might say about the necessary a
posteriori. In Section III I quickly develop the idea that we have attitudes to
some propositionsindirectlyin virtue of our attitude to other propositons.In
Sections IV,V, and VI, I employ this idea to criticize some of Tichy's arguments. Section VII provides a brief conclusion and a tentative suggestion
about how one might reformulatethe positivist doctrine that the necessary
and the a priori coincide.
It will be convenient to begin with a comment on the term 'a priori' and
'a posteriori'. Kripke uses these terms as adverbs modifying 'knows'. A
proposition is known a priori if it is known independentlyof experience,and
is known a posterioriif it is known by meansof experience.
Tichy uses the terms 'a priori'and 'a posteriori'in a way Kripkeavoids, as
adjectives modifying 'proposition'. Tichy's use can be defined in terms of
Kripke's as follows: a proposition is a priori if it can be known a priori; a
posteriori if it is not a priori, i.e., if it cannot be known a priori.3
Mixing these two uses together yields an odd-soundingasymmetry:an a
Philosophical Studies 45 (1984) 379-397.
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priori proposition can, for all the definitions tell us, be known a posteriori,
while an a posteriori propositioncannot be known a priori.Tichy's adjectival
use is helpful for some purposes:it is needed to expresssimply the positivist
thesis that the a priori and the necessary coincide and that the a posteriori
and the contingent coincide. But I will for the most part restrict myself to
Kripke'sadverbialuse.
II. IDENTITY

STATEMENTS

The first example Tichy discusses is the infamous case of Hesperus and
Phosphorus. On Kripke's view as defended in Naming and Necessity (pp.
101-105), we can fimdout only after empiricalinvestigationthat Hesperus=
Phosphorus.But it is necessarilythe case that Hesperus= Phosphorus.So it
seems that there is something which is necessary and which can be known
only a posteriori.
Tichy criticizes Kripke'suse of this example as follows. He first provides
a very brief argumentthat we can know a priorithat Hesperus= Phosphorus
(232). This argumentmay be reconstructedas follows:
(1)
(2)

The proposition that Phosphorusis Hesperusis identicalwith the
propositionthat Phosphorusis Phosphorus.
I can know a priorithat Phosphorusis Phosphorus.

Therefore,
(3)

I can know a priori that Phosphorusis Hesperus.

(1) is taken to follow from Kripke'sviews on proper names.4 (2) seems uncontroversial. And the argument from (1) and (2) to (3) seems straightforward.(It is not, as we shall see.)
Since (3) seems obviously true given assumptionsKripke accepts, Tichy
is led to suggestthat Kripkeis guilty of a sort of use-mentionconfusion. That
is, when Kripke says that we can know only a posteriori that Phosphorusis
Hesperus, he means rather that we can know only a posteriori that the
sentence 'Phosphorusis Hesperus' is true. Thus, on Tichy's view, there is
no one thing which is necessaryand can be known only a posteriori.There is
one thing, the proposition that Phosphorus is Hesperus,which is necessary
but can be known a priori, and there is another thing, the proposition that
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the sentence Phosphorus is Hesperus' is true, which can be known only
a posterioribut which is contingent, not necessary.
Now let us return to the argumentfrom (1) and (2) to (3). The argument
may seem straightforward,but it is not. The argumentpresupposes,roughly,
that if I know a priori that P, andP is the same propositionas Q, then I know
a priori that Q.5 It presupposesthat sentenceswhich expressthe same proposition are interchangeablein epistemic contexts.
This is a naturalassumption.It fits into a neat semanticsfor propositional
attitude sentences which parallelsthe semanticsof sentences involvingpossibility and necessity operators.It mesheswith a view of knowledge,belief, and
other attitudes which construesthemas relationsbetween people and propositions, and with a view of the semanticsof 'Joe knows that S', 'Joe believes
that S', etc., accordingto which these sentences state that the relevantrelation holds between Joe and the propositionexpressedby S.
Natural and appealingas this picture may be, it is not one which Kripke
is preparedto accept. If Tichy's assumptionwere correct - if sentenceswhich
express the same proposition were interchangeablein epistemic contexts then coreferential names would be interchangeablein epistemic contexts,
since changinga sentence by substitutingfor one proper name another with
the same reference will always produce a new sentence which expressesthe
same proposition as the old one. That Kripke is not committed to this view
(which he calls a "Milliansubstitutivity doctrine") is suggestedby Naming
and Necessity and made explicit in 'A Puzzle About Belief':6
I would emphasizethat there need be no contradictionin maintainingthat namesare
modally rigid, and satisfy a substitutivityprinciplefor modal contexts, while denying
the substitutivityprincipleforbelief contexts.Theentireapparatuselaboratedin "Naming
and Necessity"of the distinctionbetween epistemicand metaphysicalnecessity,and of
givinga meaningand fixing a reference,was meant to show, amongother things,that a
Millian substitutivity doctrine for modal contexts can be maintainedeven if such a
doctrine for epistemic contexts is rejected. "Namingand Necessity" never asserteda
substitutivitydoctrinefor epistemiccontexts.

Kripke takes the "official position" that "it would be foolish to draw any
conclusion, positive or negative, about substitutivity"(p. 269), but in a footnote neverthelessgoes so far as to say that "in the case of 'Hesperus'and
Phosphorus' ... it is more plausibleto suppose that the two names are definitely not interchangeablein belief contexts" (Note 43, p. 280).
Tichy's only evidence that Kripkecould not literallymean that we cannot
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know a priori that Hesperusis Phosphorusis the above short argumentthat
we obviously can know this a priori. Since Kripkewould not accept a crucial
assumptionof the short argument,there is no need to take seriouslyTichy's
proposed reinterpretationof Kripkeas confusinguse and mention.7
Nevertheless,a versionof Tichy'scriticismthat the thing which is necessary
and the thing which can only be known a posterioriare different things may
still be appropriate.
If we use the term 'proposition' in such a way that sentences which are
alike except for interchangeof coreferentialnamesexpressthe same proposition, then it seems legitimate to translate "It is necessarily the case that
Phosphorusis Hesperus"into "The proposition that Phosphorusis Hesperus
is such that: it is necessary"(or: "is necessarilytrue"). But if 'proposition'
is used in this way, and the substitutivity principle for names is false for
epistemic contexts, then we cannot likewise translate "One can only know
a posteriori that Phosphorusis Hesperus"into "The proposition that Phosphorus is Hesperus is such that: one can only know it a posteriori." So we
cannot infer that there is something which is both necessaryand such that
one can only know it a posteriori.
If the substitutivityprinciplefor namesis false in epistemic contexts, then
sentences like 'Joe knows that S' do not ascribeto Joe as an object of his
knowledge the proposition expressed by S; such sentences do not state a
relation between a person and the proposition expressed by S. This could
be because they ascribe, in context, a relation between a person and some
other proposition.8But it seems more congenialto Kripke'sviews to suppose
that 'Joe knows that S' states a relation between Joe and some non-propositional entity which is expressed or determined by S, some semantic value
of S other than the proposition it expresses.Callthe relevantsemanticvalue,
whatever it turns out to be, the "meaning"of S. Then it is the proposition
expressed by S that is necessary, but the meaning of S which can only be
known a priori; and the propositionand the meaningare different things.9

III.

INDIRECT

BELIEF

We have seen that Tichy presupposessomething which Kripke would not
grant: roughly, that coreferential names are interchangeablein epistemic
contexts. But while Kripke would not grant this assumption, I am quite
preparedto; I shall supposefor the remainderof this paperthat it is correct l
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In this section, I will introduce briefly the idea that we sometimesbelieve
one proposition indirectly, in virtueof believinga differentproposition.With
this notion in hand, it will be easy to see where severalof Tichy's arguments
go wrong.
It is often the case that there are propositions P and Q such that one
believes P, one believes Q, and one believesP in virtue of believing Q. I will
present an example, and then explain more fully what I mean.
It is reasonably uncontroversialthat in some cases in which a de dicto
belief ascriptionis true of one, a correspondingde re ascriptionis also true of
one. For instance, consider Joe, who is sitting at his desk staringat Carl, a
cup. The following de dicto ascriptionis true:
Joe believes that the cup he sees is on his desk.
This seems a case in which it is legitimateto take Joe's belief as being about a
particularcup, Carl.So the correspondingde re ascriptionis also true:
The cup Joe sees is such that: Joe believesthat it is on his desk.
The expression 'the cup Joe sees' is, in this second sentence, in referentially
transparentposition, and the cup Joe sees is Carl.So the following ascription
is also true:
Carlis such that: Joe believes that it is on his desk.
Now, on Kripke'sview there is no difference,in modal contexts, between the
truth conditions of de dicto and de re readingsof sentencesinvolvingproper
names. No doubt he would deny the analog of this view for belief. But we
have been assumingthat the semantics of belief-sentences parallelsthat of
modal sentences; if so, the above de re attribution should have the same
truth conditions as this de dicto one:
Joe believes that Carlis on his desk.
So Joe believes one proposition,that Carlis on his desk, in virtue of believing
another, that the cup he sees is on his desk.
There are several things to notice about this example. First, the two
propositions believed really are different: there are possible situations in
which the cup Joe sees is on his desk but in which Carlis not on his desk. If
belief is regardedas a relation between a person and a proposition, we have
here two different beliefs. Thus to say that Joe believes one thing in virtue
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of believing another is not to say that attributionof the formerbelief follows
from attribution of the latter together with a substitutivityprinciple. Such
an argumentcould be successful only if both attributionsascribedbelief in
the same proposition.
Second, although the two beliefs are different, both reflect the very same
mental state (at least in the narrow sense in which one's mental states are
intrinsic or nonrelational features of one, or in which one's mental state
supervenes on the physical and phenomenological facts about one). The
psychological facts about Joe which make it legitimate to describe him as
believing that the cup he sees is on his desk also license describinghim as
believingthat Carlis on his desk. No extra mental fact is needed to license the
second ascription.(In particular,Joe does not accept the sentence 'Carlis on
my desk': 'Carl'is our name for Carl,not Joe's.) Thus to say that Joe believes
one thing in virtue of believinganotheris not to say that he infers the former
from the latter. Inferenceinvolvesa changein mental state, but both propositions arebelieved in virtue of being in the very same mental state.
Third, the fact that Joe believes that Carl is on his desk is due only partly
to narrowlypsychological facts about Joe. It is also due partly to facts about
the world independent of Joe's mental state: in particular,the fact that the
cup currently in front of him is Carl. Suppose that the cup in front of him
had been Karl, a cup indistinguishablefrom Carl.Then he could have been in
the very same mental state, believed that the cup he saw was on his desk,
and thereby believed not that Carlwas on his desk but ratherthat Karl was
on his desk. The propositionthat the cup he sees is on his desk thus characterizes Joe's mental state more precisely and more nearly essentially than the
propositionthat Carlis on his desk."
Indirect belief is ratherlike indirect perception. The facing surfaceof an
apple is a different object than the apple itself; to see the one object is not
the same as to see the other. But one might see both in virtue of being in one
and the same perceptual state; if so one sees the whole apple indirectly, in
virtue of seeingits facing surface.
The example of Joe and Carl provides one case in which one believes a
singular proposition in virtue of believing a general proposition. But not
every belief in a generalproposition gives rise to a correspondingbelief in a
singular proposition. If so then, Roscoe being the tallest spy, one would,
simply in virtue of believing that the tallest spy is a spy, believe that Roscoe
is a spy, and this seems wrong."2 For our present purposes we need not
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formulate a general principle giving the conditions under which one believes
a singularproposition in virtue of believinga generalone. 3 It will be enough
to see that any instanceof the following schemais correct:
If someone, x, believes the general proposition that the unique
object currently producingin him sensations F has property G,
and in fact the object producingF in x is object a, andx perceives
a, then x believesthe singularpropositionthat a has G.
For surely one is sufficiently en rapportwith an object one is currentlyperceivingto have de re beliefs about it.
I suspect that the little principle above remains true if we substitute
'knows' for everyoccurrenceof 'believes'.But there are some reasonsto doubt
this. Kripke himself avoids problems peculiar to knowledge by alternating
between e.g. 'knows a posteriori' and 'believes on the basis of a posteriori
evidence' (see p. 35). Wheremy argumentdepends on the above principle,I
will speak of belief ratherthan knowledge; for brevity I will abbreviate'comes
to believe on the basis of a priori evidence' as 'discoversa priori'and 'comes
to believe on the basis of a posteriori evidence' as 'discoversa posteriori'.
IV.

CAN

WE DISCOVER

NECESSARY

TRUTHS

A POSTERIORI?

I have committed myself to the assumptionthat coreferentialnames are interchangeable in epistemic (and doxastic) contexts. I thus accept, as Kripke
probably would not, the short argument that we can know a priori that
Phosphorusis Hesperus.Kripkehas thus not shown (at least not, by meansof
this example, to those who accept interchange of coreferential names in
epistemic contexts) that there are necessary propositions which we cannot
discover a priori.14 But he has shown somethingvery interesting:that there
are necessarypropositionswhich we can (and do) discovera posteriori.
I take Kripke to have made exactly parallelpoints about the contingent
a priori and the necessary a posteriori: he has shown that there are some
contingent propositions which we discover a prioti (though they can be
discovered a posteriori), and that there are some necessary propositions
which we discovera posteriori (though we may also discover them a priori).
But because of the asymmetric definitions of 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' as
adjectives,the formerpoint counts as a demonstrationthat thereare contingent
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a priori propositions, while the latter point does not count as a demonstration that there are necessarya posterioripropositions.
I suspect that Tichy would deny that Kripke has shown even that we can
discover necessary propositions a posteriori. That he would is suggestedfor
example by his discussion of another purportednecessarya posterioritruth,
the proposition that heat is molecularmotion. Tichy arguesroughlythat this
is not what scientists discovered:rather,they discovered "that our heat sensations normallyoccur just in casemolecularmotion in our immediateenvironment reaches a certain level, and they posited a causal link" (234). Tichy
thus seems to want to say, first, that we did discoverthe (contingent) truth
that:
(4)

The cause of our heat sensationsis molecularmotion

and, second that we did not discoverthe (necessary)truth that:
(5)

Heat is molecularmotion.

I agree with the first claim. I even grantthat the propositionexpressedby (4)
in some sense describesour cognitive state more accuratelythan the proposition expressedby (5). But I deny the second claim. On the view presentedin
the previous section, we discovered(4) and thereby discovered(5). Not that
(4) and (5) representthe same proposition, or that we inferred(5) from (4);
rather, we believe (5) in virtue of believing (4), in the sense of the previous
section.
It is possible to argue,as I suspect Tichy would, that it is literallyincorrect
to describe our discovery as a discovery of (5), as the discoverythat heat is
molecularmotion. Really, one might say, we don't discover(5); we only discover(4), that the cause of our heat sensationsis molecularmotion.
But I don't see how one could give groundsfor this claim without denying generallythat we have attitudes toward singularpropositionsin virtue of
having attitudes toward generalones. But it seemslikely that all our attitudes
toward singularpropositions (except perhaps some of those involving ourselves, the present time, and our currentlocation) are ones we have only in
virtue of our attitudes toward generalpropositions.5 So the view under consideration would have wide-rangingsceptical consequences:not only would
we not know very many of the things we say we do, we wouldn't even believe
a great many of the things we say we do! Insistingthat really we discovered
only that the cause of heat sensationsis molecularmotion is like insistingthat
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really we see only an object's facing surfaceand not the object itself. In either
case the resultis scepticism.

V. ESSENTIAL

P'ROPERTIES

Some of Kripke's purported examples of the necessary a posteriori are
examples of attributions of essential properties to objects. Led Fred be a
certain table. It seems that we can find out that Fred is made of wood. Yet
(Kripke suggests),if Fred is made of wood, it could not have been made of
anythingelse: the propositionthat Fred is made of wood is necessary.
In Section IV, I conceded that, grantingsubstitutivity for coreferential
names, we can know a priori that Phosphorusis Hesperus; I went on to
defend the view that we can also know it a posteriori. I am certain that we
can also discovera posteriori that Fred is made of wood; but I am unclearas
to whetherwe can discoverthis a priori. At least the same short argumentwill
not show that we can.16
Tichy attacks these purported examples of the necessarya posteriori by
way of an attack on Kripke's essentialism.The attack arises from Kripke's
account of the apparent contingency of certain necessarytruths. We sometimes say things of this sort: it could have tumed out that Elizabeth II was
bom of different parents; it might have been that Fred was not made of
wood. Does this mean that is is not necessarythat Elizabeth II has certain
parents,or that Fred is made of wood?
Kripke says no. Tichy summarizeshis account: "Whatwe mean is, according to Kripke, that the epistemological situation we are in when inspecting
Elizabeth II is compatible with it being some other woman that we are
inspecting"(238).1 7 So far so good. But Tichy's next sentence is remarkable:
"It follows that unless the parenthoodquestion has been conclusivelysorted
out, we cannot be surethat it is ElizabethII that we are dealingwith."
This is certainly a strangeand unpalatableconsequence;if it follows from
Kripke'sviews it casts doubt on them. But it does not follow.
There are severalthings to notice about this case. First, the term 'epistemological situation' may be misleading. It would be natural to take the term
broadly enough that one's epistemologicalsituationwould be different if one
were seeing a different object even if all one's visualimpressionswere exactly
the same. But Kripke does not use the term this broadly. To rule out this
interpretation, he consistently speaks of "qualitativelyidentical epistemic
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situations" (104, 142, 150). Since Tichy is criticizingKripke, I shall assume
that he means the term 'epistemologicalsituation' to be taken in this narrow
sense.
Second, there may be a sense in which Tichy's conclusion is correct. By
'sure', Tichy could mean 'absolutely certain', and absolute certainty may be
so strong that I cannot be absolutely certain of P unless it is impossiblethat
I should be in the qualitativeepistemic situation I am in even though not-P.
If so I can be absolutely certain of very little- just necessary truths and
perhapspropositions about my own sense impressions.But Tichy is trying to
show that Kripke's view leads to absurd consequences, and it is not at all
absurd to be told that we cannot be absolutely certain, in this strong sense,
that it is ElizabethII we are dealingwith.
Presumably,then, Tichy does not mean, by 'sure', 'absolutelycertain'.In
fact, Tichy seems to use 'be sure' and 'know' interchangeably.But on this
reading, the supposed consequence of Kripke'sview that we cannot be sure
we are dealing with Elizabeth II does not follow. Supposing that it does
commitsTichy to this thesis:
If my qualitative epistemic situation is compatible with either
P or Q, though in fact P is true, then I cannot know P.
But this would make knowledge requirethe impossibility of error.My epistemic situation is compatible both with my being in San Antonio and with
my being a brain in a vat on Mars.If the above thesis were correct, I would
not know that I am in San Antonio. But surely I do know this.
In a way the thesis makes knowledge require even more than mere impossibilityof error.I know that I am here now. The method by which I arrived
at this belief is, in a clear sense, infallible: no matter when or where I apply
the method, it will lead me to a true belief. But my epistemic situation is
quite compatible with my being at some other place or time. If the thesis
were correct, I could not even know that I am here now!
It may seem that Tichy would have a strongercase if his thesis concerned,
not what we can know or be sure of, but what we can believe. Whatunderlies
the thesis seems to be something like the implausibleview that my cognitive
state when I know P guaranteesthat I know P, where this includes guaranteeing that P is true. But one might rejectthis view and yet accept the weaker
view that my cognitive state in believingP guaranteesthat I believeP.
If this weaker view were correct, then I could not believe that I was
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inspecting Elizabeth II. I could be in the same cognitive state I am in fact in
although I had never encountered Elizabeth II, but always only a duplicate.
In that situation I would not believe I was examining Elizabeth II. So my
cognitive state alone does not guaranteethat I believe that I am inspecting
Elizabeth II; so if the weaker view is correct, I do not believe that I am
examining Elizabeth II. This would have the consequencethat I do not know
that I am examining Elizabeth II, since I cannot know somethingwithout
believingit.
But even the weakerview is surely false. If the weakerview is correct, then
there is no indirect belief; but we have seen reason to think there is indirect
belief. Adopting the weaker view would lead to the scepticism about belief
noted at the end of Section IV.
VI.

AN

EPISTEMIC

CIRCLE?

Tichy elaboratesthe complaint we have been consideringinto what he takes
to be a dilemma for Kripke. Tichy writes that Kripke'sessentialisminvolves
"an epistemic circle. In order to establish that an object has an essential
property we have to inspect that object. But we cannot be sure that we are
inspecting the right object unless we know beforehand that the object has
that essentialproperty"(240).
Thus on Tichy's view Kripkeis committed to somethinglike the following
two theses:
(TI)

To find out that an object, a, has an essentialproperty,F, I need
to:
(i) know that the object I am examiningis a, and
(ii) find out (empirically)that the object I am examiningis F.

(T2)

To find out that the object I am examiningis a, I need to:
(i) know what propertiesa has essentially,and
(ii) find out that the object I am examininghas those properties.

If (TI) and (T2) were both true, then we could never find out either what
object we were examining or what propertiesa particularobject had, since
we could do neither until we had alreadydone the other. Presumablyat least
one or the other must go.
Tichy suggeststhat Kripke should, given other things he holds, retain(T2)
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and give up (TI) (by holding that we know a priori what essentialproperties
any particularobject has). He also suggeststhat the truth is that (T2) is false;
he puts this by suggestingthat we "admitthe obvious, namely that when we
inspect an object we know perfectly well which particularobject it is; in
other words, that the numerical identity of a directly inspected object is
always epistemically unproblematic(241)." But Tichy arguesthat acknowledgingthis involvesgivingup individualessentialism.
Let us examine these claims. I will proceed as follows: first, I will give
reasonsfor thinking(T2) to be false. I will then show that, contraryto Tichy's
view, rejectionof (T2) does not requireone to give up individualessentialism.
Finally, I will suggest that it is preciselythe rejectionof (T2) which makes it
possibleto retain(Ti) givenKripke'sview of possibleworlds.
Once we acknowledge the existence of indirect propositional attitudes,
(T2) seemsobviouslyfalse. I canknow that I am examininga without knowing
what a's essentialproperties,includingF, are.
Here are some argumentsfor this conclusionin the specialcase in which a
is Fred and F is the property of being made of wood. Supposethat I do not
know that Fred is made of wood. I do know that the object I am examining
is this object. But, in this context, 'this object' directly refers to the same
object 'Fred' names. So (by a plausiblesubstitutivity principle) I know that
the object I am examiningis Fred.'8
Second argument:suppose I introduce the name 'Joe' as a name for whatever object I am currently examining. Then I know that I am examining
Joe.'9 'Joe' names the same thing 'Fred'names.So I know that I am examining Fred.
I believe that these first two argumentsare successful.But one might have
many objections to them. (Maybe 'this object' is a disguiseddescription;if it
is a directly referringterm then maybe I don't know that the object I am
examining is this object; and maybe dubbing the object I am examining
'Joe' enables me to know only that the object I am examiningis named 'Joe',
not that it is Joe.20)
If the first two argumentsare successfulit is because something like the
following, third, argumentlies behind them. I discoverthat the object which I
am examining is the object which is givingme such-and-suchsensations.As a
matter of fact, the object giving me such-and-suchsensationsis Fred. So in
virtue of discoveringthat the object I am examiningis the object giving me
such-and-suchsensations,I discoverthat the object I am examiningis Fred.
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If this is right, then (T2) is false. Tichy himself seems to believe that (T2)
is false: he just thinks Kripkecannot admit that it is. Whynot? Becausethen,
Tichy thinks, individualessentialismcollapses.Here is the argument:
Imagineonce again that a table is subjectedto a woodennesstest. Surelythe purpose
of the test is to eliminate some otherwise conceivable possibility. Now if the numerical
identity of the table is unproblematic [i.e., if we know that the table we are examining
is Fred], it cannot be the possibility that we are dealing with some other table. It can
only be the possibility that the very same table is not wooden.

If this is a real possibility, then Fred is not essentially wooden; the same
argument could then be applied to other properties to show that Fred has
none of its propertiesessentially,and individualessentialismwould have been
shown to be false.
The error here comes in the third sentence. To see why, let us consider
the case of Pat the pen. Suppose I visit a pen manufacturerone day, and in
the course of showing me around the plant he shows me Pat. He informs
me that Pat, alone of all the pens they have made, has a distinguishingcharacteristic: the name 'Pat' is inscribedon it in red ink in a place which cannot
be seen without taking the pen apart. He even takes Pat apart and shows
me its name. He then leaves the room with Pat, comes back in a few minutes,
and presents me with a gift-wrappedpen. He does not say whetherthe pen is
Pat or not; neverthelessit is in fact Pat.
I take Pat home and use it for severaldays. But one day I pick it up and
gaze at it with a certain curious gleam in my eye. Now on Tichy's view, and
mine, there is no problem about the "numericalidentity" of the pen I am
examining.But I decide to test the pen to determinewhether it is Pat.
Now return to my quote from Tichy and apply it to the present case.
"Surely the purpose of the test is to eliminate some otherwise conceivable
possibility." Right: in this case, one would expect, the possibility the pen
is not Pat. But read on: "if the numerical identity of the [pen] is unproblematic, it cannot be the possibility that we are dealing with some other
[pen]. It can only be the possibilitythat the verysame [pen] is not [Pat]."
Thus the "otherwise conceivable possibility" we are ruling out is the
"possibility" that Pat itself is not Pat.2 Tichy's claims thus commit him
straightforwardlyto the view that it is genuinelypossiblethat Pat is not Pat.
Someone might object that the test I employed was not really a test for
Pat-hood. Really I just tested the pen to see whether it had the name 'Pat'
inscribed on it; and surely it is possible that Pat might not have had 'Pat'
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inscribedon it. I respondthat my test is just as much a Pathood test as drilling
a hole in a table (say) is a woodennesstest. It is not a necessarytruth that the
pen I test is Pat if and only if the test comes out positive - but that is a
feature of virtually all tests. (I concede that the test is only indirectly a test
of Pathood. But again,virtuallyall tests are like that.)
How can we acknowledge that "the numerical identity of a directly
inspected object is epistemically unproblematic"without the absurdconsequence that Pat might not be Pat, and without abandoningindividualessentialism? The phenomenon of indirect belief makes possible the following
answer.Whathappenswhen I test Pat for Pathood?One thing that happensis
this: I discoverthat the pen I am examiningand which is givingme sensations
F is the same as the pen I was introducedto as 'Pat'a few days ago and which
gave me sensations G. This is a contingent truth, and discoveringit involved
ruling out the contingent falsehood that the pen giving me F is some other
pen than the one which gave me G.
But in virtue of discoveringthat contingent truth, I discoveredthat Pat is
identical with Pat. As a shorthand for the "in virtue of" terminology, we
might say that I discoveredthat Pat (under the description:pen givingme F)
is identical with Pat (under the description:pen which gaveme G). (But this
terminology can easily be misleading.)That Pat is identicalwith Pat is necessary. So in virtue of discoveringa contingent truth, I discovereda necessary
truth. What do you rule out in discoveringa necessarytruth? Why, a necessary falsehood! - In this case, the necessary falsehood that Pat is not Pat,
ruled out in virtue of rulingout the related contingent falsehoodmentioned
above.
Similarly,I discover the contingent truth that the table I am examiningis
wooden, and thereby discoverthe necessarytruth that Fred is made of wood,
rulingout the necessaryfalsehood that Fred is not made of wood.
We have now seen how to reject (T2) without abandoning individual
essentialism. It is time to return to (Tl), which Tichy arguesKripke should
reject. Tichy writes that the view that essential propertiescan be known a
priori "is somethingKripke should be committed to by his view of possible
worlds as products of our own stipulations.If I want to establishthat [Fred]
is essentially wooden, all I have to do is run through all possible worlds
featuring [Fred] and check that in each of them [Fred] has been stipulated
to be wooden."
The first thing to notice about this passage is that it involves a view of
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possible worlds to which Kripkeis not, so far as I can see, committed. TichW's
interpretation of Kripke's view seems to be that we just make up possible
worlds; which worlds there are is a matter of decision or stipulation. But in
fact Kripke'snegativepoints about possibleworlds seem to be just these two:
first, possible worlds are not big concrete things,but ratherabstractstates of
the one and only big concrete thing; second, in consideringcounterfactual
situationswe need not specify them purely qualitatively.Neither point implies
that we make up possible worlds. As David Lewis has noted, Kripkeis plausibly understood as meaning by "stipulation" not creation but selection:
"When we stipulate we are selecting. Out of all the worlds there are, we
stipulatewhich ones we wish to consider."22
Suppose, then, I wonder whether Fred is necessarilywooden. I may begin
by stipulating that I will consider those worlds in which Fred exists. My
question is then whether in all those worlds Fred is wooden, and this question
cannot be resolvedby stipulation:it dependson what worlds there are.
If my initial stipulation had to identify Fred by its essence, then all I
would need to do is check my specification of its essence to see whether it
containedwoodenness. But Kripkerejectspreciselythis requirement.
Suppose that the "generalmodal status"23 of propositions is known a
priori; that is, suppose that we know a priori that if Fred is made of wood,
then it is necessarilymade of wood.24 Then I might still fail to know whether
Fred was necessarilymade of wood because I did not know that Fred was in
fact made of wood.

VII. CONCLUSION

Some of Tichy's conclusionsrest on an assumptionabout substitutivitywhich
Kripke would not accept. If we grantthe assumption,then Tichy successfully
shows that we can discovertrue identity statementsinvolvingnamesa priori,
but not that we can discovera priori what propertiesthings have essentially.
Many of Tichy's argumentsrequirean implausiblerejectionof the possibility
of indirectbelief as describedin Section 111.25
Are there necessary a posteriori propositions? I have argued that we
certainly can discover necessarypropositionsa posteriori, but have left it an
open question whether there are necessarypropositionswhich we can only
discovera posteriori.
What effect do the considerationshere presented have on the positivist
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doctrine that the a priori and the necessarycoincide?My explanationof how
we discover necessary propositions a posteriori involves our believing them
indirectly, in virtue of believing contingent propositions. I would arguethat
Kripke'sexamples of the contingent a priori involve, similarly,our believing
the contingentpropositionsindirectly,in virtue of believingnecessarypropositions.
This suggeststhat a reformulationof the positivist thesis along something
like the following lines may well be correct. Let us say that someone directly
believes a propositionjust in case he could not fail to believe it without being
in a different cognitive state. Then perhapsone can directlybelieve a proposition on the basis of a priori evidence only if it is necessary,and can directly
believe a proposition on the basis of a posteriori evidence only if it is contingent.26

NOTES
1
PavelTichy, 'Kripkeon NecessityA Posteriori',Philosophical
Studies,Vol. 43 (1983),
225 -241.
2 Saul Kripke,'Namingand Necessity', in Donald Davidsonand GilbertHarman(eds.),
Semanticsof NaturalLanguage(Dordrecht:D. Reidel, 1972), pp. 253-355, 763-769;
reprinted,with a new preface,as Namingand Necessity (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,1980). All pagereferenceswill be to the 1980 version.
I Similarremarksmay be found in ColinMcGinn,'APrioriKnowledgeandA Posteriori
Knowledge',Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 76 (1975-76), 195-208,
at 195; Philip Kitcher, 'A Priori Knowledge',PhilosophicalReview, Vol. 89 (1980),
3-23, at 3-4.
4 Tichy is a bit carelessin his defense of this claim. He attributesto Kripkethe view
that "the semanticfunction of the term 'Phosphorus'is simply to refer to Venus"and
that the names 'Hesperus'and 'Phosphorus'are "connotationless".Kripkeis not committed to anythingthis strong,thoughhe is committedto the view that the only semantic
function of proper names which is relevantin contexts of metaphysicalmodality (e.g.
"It is necessarythat ...") is to refer to Venus. (On the relation of Kripke'sviews to
various kinds of connotation or sense, see Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1981), Section 1.1, and Salmon,reviewof Linsky,
Names and Descriptions,Journal of Philosophy,Vol. 76, No. 8 (August, 1979), 436452 at 442-3.)
It does clearlyfollow from Kripke'sviews that if two namesreferto the samething,
interchangingthem in contexts of metaphysicalmodality will not affect the truth of
the containingsentence. If S is any Englishsentence,let 'the propositionthat S' denote
whateversemanticvalue of S is relevantin contexts of metaphysicalmodality.So understood, (1) does indeedfollow from Kripke'sviewson propernames.
s A bit more carefully: letting S and R range over Englishsentences, the argument
presupposesthat if 'I can know a priori that S' is true (in a context c), and S expresses
(in c) the same propositionthat R expresses(in c), then 'I can know a priorithat R' is
true (in c).

THE NECESSARY

A POSTERIORI

395

6 Saul A. Kripke, 'A Puzzle About Belief', in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 239-283. Quotation is from Note 9, p. 273. Compare pp.
20-21 of the Preface to the 1980 edition of Naming and Necessity.
7 A reinterpretation which should seem implausible anyway, given Kripke's sensitivity
to the use-mention distinction; see e.g. Note 25, p. 62, on 'sloppy, colloquial speech,
which often confuses use and mention". There is, however, an apparently careless
paragraph in 'A Puzzle About Belief' which could be used to support Tichy's interpretation: see p. 243.
8 For suggestions about belief along these lines, see Robert Stalnaker, 'Indexical Belief',
Synthese, Vol. 49 (1981), 129-151; Bas C. Van Fraassen, 'Propositional Attitudes in
Weak Pragmatics', Studia Logica, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1979), 365-374. For criticism of Van
Fraassen's proposal, see J. Paul Reddam, 'Van Fraassen on Propositional Attitudes',
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 42 (1982), 101-110.
9 Perhaps this objection is not very serious. After all, if meanings uniquely determine
propositions then we can say that a meaning is necessary just in case the proposition it
determines is necessary. In that case there is one thing, the meaning, which is both
necessary and a posteriori. But my guess is that any plausible candidates for what I have'
called "meanings" will be things which do not uniquely determine propositions. (For
instance, suppose "meanings" turned out to be David Kaplan's "characters", as described
in Kaplan, 'On the Logic of Demonstratives', in Peter A. French et al. (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Press, 1979), pp. 401-412, and much more fully in Demonstratives, unpublished. It
makes no sense to speak of a character as necessary, since the same character will determine different propositions in different contexts.)
10 I shall accept this assumption without argument. It is argued for in
Tom McKay, 'On
Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions', Philosophical Studies, Vol. 39 (1981), 287-303.
Also relevant is G. W. Fitch, 'Names and the "De Re - De Dicto" Distinction', Philosophical Studies, Vol. 39 (1981), 25-34. (Most writers on the subject suppose, with
Kripke, that the assumption is false.)
" The proposition that Carl is
on his desk clearly does not characterize Joe's belief
state essentially, since as we have just seen Joe could easily have been in the same mental
state without believing that proposition. I doubt that the proposition that the cup he
sees is ornhis desk characterizes his mental state essentially, either. But it characterizes
that state more nearly essentially: we will have to travel to more remote regions of
logical space to find a possible situation in which he is in the same mental state but does
not believe that proposition.
12 This was the objection raised by critics of Quine's early conjecture that it was always
legitimate to "export" a singular term from inside to outside a belief context. See W. V.
Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' and David Kaplan, 'Quantifying In',
both reprinted in Leonard Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality (Oxford, 1971).
13 For an account of de re belief which I believe can be adapted to provide such a
principle, see David Lewis, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se', Philosophical Review, Vol.
88 (1979), 513-543, at 538-543.
14 Kripke himself is presumably disbarred from speaking of discovering, knowing,
etc., propositions, since as we have seen if on his view there are things we know, they
must be something other than propositions. But since I grant the substitutivity principle
for names this terminology is open to me.
's Part of this claim should be controversial, but part should not. Take any attitude
of mine toward a singular proposition - say, my belief that water is wet. I might have
been in exactly the same cognitive state and yet not have believed that water is wet
(believing instead, perhaps, that XYZ is wet). (For a well-known argument for this
conclusion, see Hilary Putnam's discussion of "Twin Earth" in 'The Meaning of Meaning', in Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (Cambridge:

396

CURTIS BROWN

CambridgeUniversityPress,1975), pp. 215-271,at pp. 223-227; see also TylerBurge's
extended discussionof a similarargumentin 'Individualismand the Mental',Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 4 (1979), 73-121.) So it should be clearthat I believethe
propositionthat water is wet partly in virtueof my cognitivestate and partly in virtue
of the way my environmenthappensto be. Whatshould be controversialis only that
my cognitive state is essentiallydescribableby meansof some generalproposition.For
further discussion of all this, see my Beliefs and Their Objects (Ph.D. dissertation,
PrincetonUniversity,1982).
16 Here are two possiblearguments.(1) Supposethat there is only one necessaryproposition. Then, given that sentenceswhich expressthe same propositionare interchangeable in epistemic contexts, 'Fredis wood' expressesthe same propositionas 'Hesperus
is Hesperus';so if I discovera priori that Hesperusis Hesperus,I discovera priori that
Fredis wood.
(2) Suppose that sentences alike except for interchangeof any coreferentialrigid
designators express the same proposition. And suppose that the conjunction of all
Fred's essential propertiesis a propertyonly Fred could have. (Kripkeexpressessome
hesitation about this second assumption:see Naming and Necessity, p. 46.) Let F
expressthis conjunction,except for woodenness.Then 'the table which is wood and F'
rigidlydenotes Fred. Presumablywe discovera priori that the table which is wood and
F is wood. But then we discovera priorithat Fred is wood.
But I have not committedmyself to a view of propositionswhich would make the
first assumptionof either argumenttrue. (Note that both are true if propositionsare,
as they are sometimestaken to be, sets of possibleworlds or functions from worlds to
truth values.)For instance,perhapssingularpropositions,but not generalpropositions,
have as constituentsthe objects they are about. Thenthe propositionthat Fredis wood
would have Fred as a constituent, but neither the propositionthat the table which is
wood and F is wood nor the propositionthat Hesperusis Hesperuswould. (This sort
of view was entertainedby Russelland has been revivedby DavidKaplan.)
17 Kripke does not actually maintainthat if I say 'Fred could have been made of ice'
I mean (1): 'It could have been the case that the table I was inspectingwas made of
ice'. Perhapsit is more plausibleto interpretKripkeas attributingto me somethinglike
the fallaciousinferencefrom (1) and (2): 'The table I was inspecting= Fred'to (3): 'It
could have been the case that Fred was made of ice'. (CompareNamingandNecessity,
pp. 143-4 and Note 72.)
18 I
am beingharmlesslycarelessabout use and mentionhereand in what follows.
19 Indeed, this parallelsKripke's
purportedexamplesof the contingenta priori.On my
view we know this propositionboth a priori and a posteriori.For my treatmentof the
contingenta priorisee Beliefsand TheirObjects,ChapterFive, Section II.
20 For something like this last objection see Keith S. Donnellan, 'The ContingentA
Prioriand Rigid Designators',in Peter A. Frenchet al. (ed.), ContemporaryPerspectives
in the Philosophy of Language(Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress, 1979),
pp. 45-60.
21

On my view it is in fact conceivable, though not possible, that Pat is not Pat. Kripke

seems to take the view that the impossibleis not conceivableeither; thus his explanations of what we are "really" conceiving when we think we're conceivingthat e.g.
heat is not molecularmotion. I think it better to say that we can conceivethe impossible,
but only indirectly.Wheneverwe conceivethe impossiblewe do so in virtueof conceiving
somethingpossible.
22 David Lewis, 'Individuationby Acquaintanceand by Stipulation',Philosophical
Review, Vol. 92 (1983), 3-32, at 18.
23 The term is fromAlbertCasullo,'Kripkeon the A Prioriand the Necessary',
Analysis,
Vol. 37 (1977), 152-159.
24 Kripkedoes make this
assumption:see 'Identityand Necessity',in MiltonK. Munitz

THE NECESSARY

A POSTERIORI

397

(ed.),Identity and Individuation(New York: New York University Press, 1971), p. 153.
Indeed, more of his arguments than I have mentioned seem to require such a rejection. One might respond to his criticism of Kripke's views about the word 'heat' (235 -6)
by acknowledging that any competent speaker of English truly believes that 'heat'
names molecular motion, but suggesting that this belief may well be indirect.
26 I am indebted to Steven Luper-Foy for helpful discussion about this paper. Work on
the paper was supported by a summer stipend from the National Endowment for the
Humanities.
25

Philosophy Department,
Trinity University,
San Antonio, TX 78284,
U.S.A.

